Claudia N. Case, individually, and as Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993, and as Trustee of the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999, Defendant/Appellant, v. Arnold K. West and Mary Helen West, Plaintiffs/Appellees : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Claudia N. Case, individually, and as Trustee of the
Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993, and as
Trustee of the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated
January 21, 1999, Defendant/Appellant, v. Arnold
K. West and Mary Helen West, Plaintiffs/Appellees
: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James \"Tucker\" Hansen; Hansen & Wright; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees.
Vincent C. Rampton; Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough PC; Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Case v. West, No. 20050315 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5733
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as 
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated 
May 6, 1993, and as Trustee of the 
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated 
January 21, 1999, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Vo. 
ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN 
WEST, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees. 
No. 20050315-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From a Final Civil Judgment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
Judge Taylor, Case No. 990404457 
James "Tucker" Hansen 
HANSEN & WRIGHT 
388 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
Telephone: 801-224-2273 
Fax: 801-224-2457 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801-521-3200 
Fax: 801-328-0537 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
711499vl 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLAE54G5QUR: 
SEP 2 I 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as 
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated 
May 6, 1993, and as Trustee of the 
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated 
January 21, 1999, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
1TQ. 
ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN 
WEST, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees. 
No. 20050315-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From a Final Civil Judgment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
Judge Taylor, Case No. 990404457 
James "Tucker" Hansen 
HANSEN & WRIGHT 
388 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
Telephone: 801-224-2273 
Fax: 801-224-2457 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801-521-3200 
Fax: 801-328-0537 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
7U499vl 14064.0001 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT 1 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY QUIETED TITLE TO THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY IN APPELLEES 1 
A. The Trial Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Appellees' 
Quiet Title Claim 1 
B. Appellees Neither Claimed Nor Established a Right in the Subject 
Property, Prior to the Court's Order of Summary Judgment, 
Sufficient to Sustain a Quiet Title Claim 2 
POINT II. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SHOULD HAVE 
PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM RULING, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, THAT GEORGIA LAMAR WEST HAD 
"WAIVED" APPELLEES' CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO PAY 
TAXES 3 
A-. Appellant Presented the Trial Court, and This Court, With Sufficient 
Information by Affidavit to Establish a Genuine Issue of Material 
Fact Concerning the Alleged Waiver 4 
B. Appellees Received Ample "Written Notice" of Georgia Lamar 
West's Intent to Declare Their Default 5 
C. Appellant Was Not Required to "Marshal the Evidence" in 
Challenging an Order Granting Summary Judgment 6 
D. Appellant Could Not Raise the Statute of Frauds as an Affirmative 
Defense in Her Answer, as It Rebutted No Allegation in the 
Complaint 8 
E. Appellees' Claimed Modification of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract Is Not Outside the Statute of Frauds 9 
711499vl i 14064.0001 
POINT III. APPELLEES' FAILURE TO PERFORM THE UNIFORM REAL 
ESTATE CONTRACT, AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO 
SEEKING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, MAY NOT BE 
EXCUSED UNDER DEFENSES APPLICABLE TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF "UNCLEAN HANDS" 10 
POINT IV. APPELLANT (IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE) WAS NOT A 
PARTY TO THE 1987 AGREEMENT, AND SHOULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN HELD LIABLE FOR BREACH THEREOF 10 
POINT V. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO ORAL ARGUMENT 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 12 
CONCLUSION 13 
7H499vl ii 14064.0001 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 2002 Utah 4, 73 P.3d 315 4 
Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1996) 9 
Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002) 4 
Chen v. Stuart, 2004 Utah 82, 100 P.3d 1177 6 
Kressler v. Peterson, 675 P. 2d 1193 (Utah 1984) 3 
Miller v. Celebration Mining Company, 29 P.3d 1231 (Utah 2001) 7 
Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Company, 888 P.2d 659 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) . 11 
Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 20 P. 3d 332 3 
Rules 
Rule 56(e) Utah R. Civ. P 7 
Rule 7(E), Utah R. Civ. P 12 
Rules of Judicial Administration 4-501(3)(C) 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 2 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-40-1 1 
711499vl Hi 14064.0001 
Defendant and Appellant Claudia N. Case, individually and as Trustee of the 
Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993 and the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated 
January 21, 1999, by counsel and pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, submits the following Reply Brief in support of her appeal from the trial 
court's orders entered in the above-entitled action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY QUIETED TITLE 
TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN APPELLEES. 
Appellees first take the position that they are invulnerable to challenge in having 
persuaded the trial court to quiet title to a property in which they claimed no present 
interest, since it was not properly preserved before the trial court, and was properly pled 
in any case. This argument suffers two fatal flaws. 
A, TJie Trial Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction of 
Appellees' Quiet Title Claim. 
First (and as noted in Appellant's opening Brief), a trial court's lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of a claim may be raised at any time during the proceeding. (See 
Appellant's opening Brief at 3.) A quiet title claim is a statutory proceeding and remedy, 
the elements of which are defined (and necessarily proscribed) at Utah Code Ann. § 78-
40-1, etseq. For those reasons more fully addressed at 19-20 of Appellant's opening 
Brief, an action to quiet title must rest on a claim of title in property, not an attempt to 
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wrest title from another. The cause of action is unavailable for such a purpose, and those 
who invoke it as such seek a remedy not provided under the statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) confers upon the district courts of the state of Utah 
"original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law" (Emphasis added.) Prosecution of a non-
existent cause of action - quieting title in property to which the claimant asserts no 
ownership interest - is by definition an action "prohibited by law" by the very nature of 
the limited cause of action conferred by the legislature. To brush such an error aside as 
nothing more than a waivable irregularity in pleadings would be to ignore the limited 
scope of the cause of action. Appellant's argument that the trial court exceeded the 
limitations of its subject matter jurisdiction in quieting title to property neither owned nor 
claimed by Appellees goes far beyond a simple 12(b)(6) motion which Appellant forgot 
to make. It is, rather, the exercise of jurisdiction over a cause of action outside the scope 
of what the legislature granted, and therefore prohibited by law. 
B. Appellees Neither Claimed Nor Established a Right in the 
Subject Property, Prior to the Court's Order of Summary 
Judgment, Sufficient to Sustain a Quiet Title Claim. 
Appellees next claim that their cause of action before the trial court was, in fact, a 
quiet title claim (even though they sought an order compelling the conveyance of the 
property to them). The Court need go no further than the face of Appellees' Complaint to 
see the fallacy in their reasoning. 
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Appellees nowhere claimed before the trial court that the warranty deed held in 
trust pending completion of the Uniform Real Estate Contract operated, without more, to 
convey title to the Subject Property (as indeed, they cannot - a deed held in trust only is 
not operable to convey an interest in property - see Kressler v. Peterson, 675 P. 2d 1193 
(Utah 1984); Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 20 P. 3d 332). Appellees' claim, rather, is 
that Georgia Lamar West (and thereafter Appellant) was obliged, but had refused, to 
convey title to the Subject Property in 1998, when Appellees made demand therefor. 
Whether that refusal constituted breach of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (and if so, by 
whom) was the subject matter of the claim, and of the court's orders on summary 
judgment. As such, the quiet title claim was out of place, and should not have been 
entertained. 
POINT II. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SHOULD 
HAVE PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM 
RULING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT GEORGIA 
LAMAR WEST HAD "WAIVED" APPELLEES' 
CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO PAY TAXES. 
Appellees offer a number of arguments in support of the trial court's conclusion 
that, as a matter of law, Georgia Lamar West waived their contractual obligation to pay 
taxes on the Subject Property. Yet in their own Brief, Appellees acknowledge that any 
claim of contractual waiver is, by its nature, "extremely fact-sensitive" - Appellees' Brief 
at p. 20. Appellant agrees. The lower court should have deferred to a finder of fact 
following full presentation of the facts at trial. 
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A. Appellant Presented the Trial Court, and This Court, With Sufficient 
Information by Affidavit to Establish a Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
Concerning the Alleged Waiver. 
Appellees first argue that they were entitled to the trial court's finding that Georgia 
Lamar West "waived" their obligation to pay taxes under the contract, in that they 
established a "prima facie case" of waiver, which Appellant thereafter failed to rebut. The 
Court need go no further than the facts as summarized at pps. 25-26 of Appellant's 
opening Brief to see the fallacy of this position. 
Summary judgment is inappropriate where the opposing party presents facts 
which, if construed in that party's favor, would preclude the requested relief. Ahlstrom v. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 2002 Utah 4, 73 P.3d 315; Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63 
P.3d 721 (Utah 2002). In her submittals to the trial court, Appellant established both 
words and conduct from Georgia Lamar West completely inconsistent with the required 
intent to relinquish a known right - statements to Appellant that Appellees were failing to 
pay the taxes (R. 0666); conveyances of Georgia Lamar West's interest in the Property to 
the trusts, in derogation of Appellee's claims (R. 0015); and her refusal to convey the 
Property to Appellees upon demand, even when they claimed to have performed under the 
contract {Id.). No amount of re-characterization on Appellees' behalf can erase the 
existence of a judicable controversy over whether, under a totality of circumstances, 
Georgia Lamar West did or did not intend to rewrite the 1987 Agreement to impose upon 
herself (rather than Appellees) the obligation to pay taxes while they were occupying the 
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Subject Property, and otherwise performing according to the terms of the Agreement. 
Appellant was clearly entitled to trial on this issue. 
B. Appellees Received Ample "Written Notice" of Georgia Lamar 
West's Intent to Declare Their Default. 
While they do not urge the point as a defense in the "Argument" section of their 
Brief, Appellees make passing reference in their "Statement of Facts" to the 1987 
agreement's requirement that a default be preceded by "written notice". The contract is 
silent, though, as to when the written notice must issue, who must send it, to what 
individual or address it must be sent, or what it must contain. 
Appellees have received an abundance of "written notice" that Georgia Lamar 
West did not intend to convey the Subject Property to them due to their failure to pay 
taxes thereon - from the notice received from the Utah County Recorder's Office upon 
their attempt to-record the Warranty Deed in 1998 that the Property had been conveyed to 
the trust, to pleadings, moving papers, and correspondence of counsel, to the responsive 
pleadings in this action. The purpose of any written notice provision in an agreement is to 
put the affected party on notice of the other party's intentions. Appellees can hardly 
claim ignorance in this regard (as the trial court apparently believed - none of the 
decisions of the trial court from which this appeal is taken addressed the notice issue in 
anyway). 
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G. Appellant Was Not Required to "Marshal the Evidence" in 
Challenging an Order Granting Summary Judgment. 
At pps. 19-20 of their Brief, Appellees make the singular argument that Appellant 
may not challenge the lower court's Order Granting Summary Judgment on the question 
whether Georgia Lamar West waived her right under the real estate contract at issue in 
this action, because she has failed to "marshal the evidence" in support of the lower 
court's ruling. Appellees cite the Court to Chen v. Stuart, 2004 Utah 82, 100 P.3d 1177, 
and cases cited therein. 
To begin with, there was no trial in this matter. The Court entered summary 
judgment on the basis of Appellees' Affidavits, which have been made a part of the 
record herein, and cited to in Appellants' opening Brief. Pages 20-27 of Appellant's 
opening Brief discussed the reasons why the Affidavits should not have precluded the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact, defeating summary judgment. With no trial 
record, Appellees' vague demand that there be more "marshalling" of evidence than this 
is a mystery. 
More fundamental, though, is the fact that Appellees' argument completely 
misapprehends the standard of review applicable to orders granting summary judgment. 
The Chen decision addressed findings of fact made by the trial court following a non-jury 
trial, which the appellate court reviews under a "clearly erroneous" standard: 
A trial court's findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . in 
order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, 
fajn appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
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then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trail court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence" 
(Citing Estate o/Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). 
2004 Utah 82 at U 19 (emphasis added). 
An order granting summary judgment, by contrast, is not reviewed under a "clearly 
erroneous" standard, as it does not entail a weighing or sifting of evidence. It 
presupposes that there is no genuine issue of material fact. This Court affords the trial 
court no deference whatever in the making of this determination; rather, it presumes all 
factual questions against the movant, and reviews the trial court's legal determination de 
novo for correctness (see cases cited under subpoint A, above). Only if the trial court's 
application of the correct law to all facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party still justifies the entry of summary judgment will be trial court's ruling be 
sustained. See generally Miller v. Celebration Mining Company, 29 P.3d 1231 (Utah 
2001). 
To demonstrate the trial court's error in granting summary judgment herein, 
Appellant was required only to present evidence by affidavit sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Rule 56(e) Utah R. Civ. P. For those reasons set out above and in her 
opening Brief, Appellant submits that she has clearly done so. She is not required to 
marshal evidence supporting the trial court's "findings", and then overcome any 
presumption created by the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. 
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D. Appellant Could Not Raise the Statute of Frauds as an 
Affirmative Defense in Her Answer, as It Rebutted No 
Allegation in the Complaint 
In response to Appellant's argument that the transfer of tax payment obligations 
from Appellees to Georgia Lamar West was a modification of the 1987 agreement which 
needed to be in writing, Appellees point out that the Utah Statute of Frauds was not pled 
as an affirmative defense in Appellant's Answer (Appellees' Brief at 20-21). 
It is true that a defense based upon the statute of frauds is by definition an 
"affirmative defense" which must be pled in response to a claim. The difficulty here, 
though, is that that statute of frauds did not directly address any of the operative 
allegations of the Complaint. Nowhere in their Complaint did Appellees make the 
assertion that, even though they had failed to pay the taxes on the Subject Property, 
Georgia Lamar West had excused that performance by an express waiver or novation of 
contract. Appellees allege, rather, that they had performed in full under the contract - an 
allegation which Appellant denied. (Complaint, R. 0015 at ^ 10; Answer, R. 0024, at 
U 9.) Only during the course of motion practice (which resulted in the Order Granting 
Partial Summary Judgment in Appellees' favor) did Appellees admit that they paid no 
taxes, but claimed that Georgia Lamar West had excused their performance in this regard 
through an express novation or waiver. As such, Appellant's failure to raise the statute of 
frauds as an affirmative defense cannot be deemed a waiver of that defense in face of 
later-asserted claims. 
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E. Appellees' Claimed Modification of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract Is Not Outside the Statute of Frauds. 
Appellees argue, at pps. 21-22 of their Brief, that their alleged verbal agreement 
with Georgia Lamar West, under which she assumed the obligation to pay taxes on the 
Subject Property on Appellees' behalf, falls outside the statute of frauds because they 
have "changed position by performing an oral modification" (citing Allen v. Kingdon, 723 
P.2d 394 (Utah 1996), as well as cases invoking the doctrine of "part performance"). 
Appellees fail, however, to articulate any change in their position which would 
render inequitable the enforcement of the contract as originally framed. It is Appellees' 
position that Georgia Lamar West knowingly and voluntarily paid taxes on their behalf, 
while letting them continue in occupancy of the Subject Property, as a result of a verbal 
understanding. As such, the only "change of position" to which Appellees can point is 
that they have/not paid the taxes, or reimbursed anyone for having done so on their 
behalf. The doctrine of part performance calls for some significant change of position in 
reliance upon a promise, such that the party invoking the doctrine would suffer injury 
through imposition of the statute of frauds. The only injury which Appellees would incur 
would be the necessity of performing as per their agreement, and reimbursing the estate of 
Georgia Lamar West for taxes paid. The doctrine of part performance has no application 
under these circumstances. 
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POINT III. APPELLEES'FAILURE TO PERFORM THE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, AS A 
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SEEKING SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE, MAY NOT BE EXCUSED UNDER 
DEFENSES APPLICABLE TO THE DOCTRINE OF 
"UNCLEAN HANDS", 
At pps. 16-17 of their opposing Brief, Appellees argue that their failure to perform 
the requirements of the 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract was excusable by the trial 
court under the doctrine of "unclean hands," as there was no showing of bad faith 
(Appellees' Brief at pps. 16-17). Appellees' argument, however, misapprehends the 
requirements underlying specific performance. 
For those reasons set out at pps. 21-23 of Appellant's opening Brief, a party 
seeking specific performance must "do equity" by performing under the terms of the 
contract. There is no requirement, under the governing case law, that failure to perform 
be motivated by malice, bad faith or intent. By their own admissions, Appellees failed 
outright to perform a material requirement of the real estate contract. Under the cases 
cited in Appellant's opening Brief, this should have been fatal to their claim for specific 
performance - whether their failure rose to the level of "unclean hands" or not. 
POINT IV. APPELLANT (IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE) WAS 
NOT A PARTY TO THE 1987 AGREEMENT, AND 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HELD LIABLE FOR 
BREACH THEREOF. 
Appellees' opposing Brief fails completely to dislodge the fundamental fact that 
Appellant (whether individually or in her capacity as trustee of Georgia Lamar West's 
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two trusts) was not party to the 1987 Agreement, and may not be held liable for any 
breach thereof. The decision of Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Company, 
888 P.2d 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) clearly established a distinction which neither the trial 
court, nor Appellees' arguments on appeal, can overcome. Georgia Lamar West's quit 
claim conveyance of her right, title and interest in and to the Subject Property did not 
operate to convey, assign, or otherwise transfer any right or interest in the contract, but 
only in the premises. See 888 P.2d at 663. Appellees' own argument, at pps. 22-23 of 
their Brief, implicitly acknowledges that some transfer of the contract right - not the 
premises - must occur in order to hold Appellant liable thereunder. By law, and 
according to the Oquirrh decision, a quit claim deed simply does not rise to that level. 
Appellees assert that Appellant's position, if accepted, would permit Georgia 
Lamar West's estate to escape all liability under the contract. Quite the contrary -
Appellant acknowledged that, if the lower court properly found that Appellees were 
contractually entitled to conveyance of the Subject Property, the Estate of Georgia Lamar 
West is legally accountable therefor. Their contractual obligation, however, did not pass 
to Appellant (or the trusts) by virtue of a single quit claim deed. So long as the Oquirrh 
decision remains governing law, Appellant may not be found liable for breach of the 1987 
Agreement. 
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POINT V. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO ORAL ARGUMENT 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
Reduced to its essence, Appellees' argument concerning the trial court's failure to 
afford Appellant oral argument before entering summary judgment is that, since 
Appellant had failed to demonstrate, in her written submittals, the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact, the error was harmless. Were this Court to adopt such a standard, 
the right to oral argument articulated at former Rules of Judicial Administration 4-
501(3)(C) (now subsumed under Rule 7(E), Utah R. Civ. P.) would become meaningless. 
The prevailing party on a dispositive motion may always contend that oral argument 
would not have affected the outcome. By the same token, the party against whom a ruling 
is entered on written submittals cannot possibly articulate every circumstance which 
might have arisen during oral argument, and affected the resulting decision. It is for this 
very reason that the Rules expressly provide for oral argument on motions which may 
dispose of all or part of a pending action, as a matter of right. 
Appellees cite inapplicable case precedent concerning issues of a strictly legal 
nature, and contend that by reason thereof, the trial court's denial of oral argument in this 
case was not prejudicial. Yet by Appellees' own admission, the lower court's findings in 
this case were "extremely fact-sensitive"- Appellees' Brief at p. 20. The trial court's 
open disregard of factual issues and disputes in the entry of its ruling bear out the fact that 
it simply failed to come to grips with this extreme fact sensitivity. It is self-evident that 
oral argument could have improved the trial court's understanding in this regard. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set out in her opening Brief, Appellant 
submits that the trial court's entry of summary judgment herein was erroneous, and 
should be reversed. 
DATED this 21st day of September, 2005. 
JONES WALDO HOLBRQOK & McDONOUGH, PC 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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